As referendum day approaches, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee expresses serious concern over several key aspects of the proposed constitution and the process leading to it.
Introduction
The proposed constitution includes and introduces safeguards for human rights protections and for the first time addresses the protection of digital rights. However, in the view of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, the proposed constitution also introduces provisions that risk limiting fundamental freedoms and human rights. Furthermore, the new constitution also explicitly weakens the status of Kazakhstan’s international human rights obligations relative to national legislation and risks erosion of rights protections. The new constitution also provides for a comprehensive redesign of Kazakhstan’s state architecture, one that will weaken parliamentary authority while expanding the executive’s powers at the expense of other branches of government, potentially reversing much of the decentralizing progress from the 2022 constitutional amendments. In addition, the weeks leading up to the referendum have seen increased pressure on dissent and freedom of expression as authorities appear to seek to suppress debate and open criticism of the new constitution.
Background on the process
President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced the constitutional referendum last month, on February 11, 2026 – just one day before the final version of the proposed new constitution was published. The amendment process began last fall when the president first announced the need for parliamentary reform, however the initiative soon expanded into a broader and thorough constitutional overhaul. In January 2026, the Constitutional Commission was set down, tasked with drafting the new proposal. A short time after, on January 31, the Commission released its initial version of the new constitution. Just short of two weeks later – on February 12 – followed the final draft, which is set for a vote this Sunday. The proposed amendments now revise more than 80 percent of the existing constitution, and constitute a de-facto new constitution.
Pre-referendum climate
In the run-up to the referendum, independent journalists, human rights defenders, and others who have expressed criticism about the proposed constitution have encountered various forms of pressure, including, in some instances, administrative detention. However, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee expects that local civil society organizations will be able to monitor the proceedings on referendum day unhinderedly. Monitoring of the referendum will also be conducted by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). In its initial Needs Assessment Mission Report the OSCE/ODIHR also underlines issues related to freedom of expression in time leading up to the referendum:
“Internet remains the main space for critical discourse, but, according to ODIHR NAM interlocutors, it is increasingly subject to stricter regulation and control, including blocking critical websites, requests to remove content, and administrative cases against journalists and activists for alleged dissemination of false information.”
At the same time, the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law reports on increased pressure against a wide range of activists in recent weeks, and has published a list documenting more than 40 individuals who have reportedly been subjected to measures in connection with their critical views on the new constitution.
For instance, in late February, law enforcement authorities in Almaty detained activist Orazaly Erzhanov who had reportedly called for a boycott of the referendum. On February 25, the Specialized Interdistrict Investigative Court of Almaty ordered his detention for ten days. Ten days later, the same court extended his pre-trial custody for two months.
In addition, independent media outlets, journalists, and online voices have encountered various restrictions and challenges in recent weeks. On March 6, the independent media outlet Vlast.kz reported that it suffered a DDoS attack on that day. This marked the third such incident in a short time for the outlet, following similar attacks in January and last November. As the Diplomat reported in late February, several journalists have been fined for posting social media polls on the referendum, while others have applied for – and have been denied – permission to poll their readers on the referendum.
Social media users also report issues: in recent weeks, Meta has deleted numerous posts, and in some cases purged entire accounts, of activists, journalists and human rights defenders. Human rights defender and International Women of Courage Laureate Bakhytzhan Toregozhina recently told the Norwegian Helsinki Committee that on March 10, around 40 of her posts on Instagram were abruptly deleted. According to her, this was around a month’s worth of posts, most of which were about the proposed changes to the constitution. Similarly, the social media accounts of journalists Assem Zhapisheva, Murat Daniyar and others were purged earlier this month.
Key human rights provisions
The new proposed new constitution explicitly enshrines “Miranda-style” detention safeguards and elevates core principles like presumption of innocence, the prohibition of double jeopardy and retroactive application of laws to the section on fundamental rights, freedoms and duties. The constitution also for the first time addresses digital rights and introduces modern digital rights protections, strengthening procedural guarantees.
However, having reviewed the new constitution, it is the view of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee that there is a clear risk that several of the changes to the constitution will impose, or may open up for the imposition of, undue restrictions on fundamental freedoms and human rights.
For instance, Article 23 of the proposed constitution will replace the previous Article 20 on freedom of expression and creativity – while reaffirming these freedoms, the new provision lists protected forms of creativity, introduces detailed restrictions and includes qualifying language that permits limitations on free expression. Point 4 of Article 23 of the proposed constitution reads: “Freedom of speech and freedom of dissemination of information must not infringe upon the honor and dignity of other persons, the health of citizens, or public morality, nor disrupt public order”.
The Norwegian Helsinki Committee is particularly concerned by the inclusion of vague and undefined concepts such as “honor and dignity” and “public morality” in the proposed constitution. We consider that these broadly worded terms create wide discretionary room for authorities to restrict freedom of expression, and potentially enable arbitrary limitations on speech, journalism, and public debate under the pretext of protecting these abstract values.
Concern also arises from Article 5 of the proposed constitution, which establishes the hierarchy of legal norms in Kazakhstan. Under the current constitution, ratified international treaties take precedence over domestic legislation, thereby ensuring that Kazakhstan remains bound by its international human rights obligations. The new draft however removes this explicit supremacy and instead subordinates the application of international treaties to national legislation. Specifically, point 2 of Article 5 states that “the procedure for the application of international treaties on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan is determined by law.”
The Norwegian Helsinki Committee considers that this change significantly weakens the direct enforceability of Kazakhstan’s international human rights obligations. By making treaty application dependent on domestic law, the draft reduces the ability of courts and citizens to invoke ratified treaty standards as supreme law in domestic proceedings.
Another cause of concern is article 30 of the proposed constitution. Point 2 of this article defines marriage as a voluntary union between a man and a woman – a provision that appears for the first time in Kazakhstan’s constitutional history. This explicit wording at the constitutional level, combined with the recent adoption of amendments banning so-called “LGBT propaganda”, risks deepening discrimination and stigmatization against the LGBTIQ+ community. In the view of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee this further constricts the already limited legal and social space for LGBTIQ+ rights and recognition, while constraining human rights advocacy, awareness-raising efforts, and free journalism and open reporting on related issues.
The Norwegian Helsinki Committee also notes Article 6 of the proposed constitution, which addresses ideological and political diversity as well as freedom of association. Point 4 of Article 6 – mirroring the equivalent provision (5.4) in the current constitution – prohibits the activities of foreign political parties and trade unions, as well as religiously based political parties. It also bans financing of political parties and trade unions by foreign legal entities, foreign citizens and stateless persons, foreign states, and international organizations, all in line with the existing constitution. A new addition however expands this prohibition to include legal entities with foreign participation – in the view of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, this broad and vaguely defined category could grant authorities wider discretion to scrutinize, interfere with, or restrict the work of, civil society organizations perceived or alleged to have any foreign ties.
Furthermore, point 5 of Article 6 elevates to the constitutional level the existing obligations for non-profit organizations receiving foreign funding to disclose such resources openly and in full compliance with the law. This requirement is already mandated by national legislation, and since 2023, authorities have published details on such civil society actors in the dedicated public foreign funding register. The Norwegian Helsinki Committee is concerned that enshrining this provision at the constitutional level may signal authorities’ intent to intensify scrutiny of independent civil society organizations.
Changes to state architecture
The 2022 constitutional amendments, initiated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and approved by nationwide referendum in November 2022, were explicitly presented as a shift away from Kazakhstan’s long-standing super-presidential model and toward a greater balance in the division of powers. The 2022 amendments strengthened parliament’s role, redistributed certain presidential prerogatives, banned the death penalty, introduced a single non-renewable seven-year presidential term, and enhanced institutional checks and citizen participation mechanisms.
However, if enacted, the proposed new constitution would undermine and largely reverse that progress by significantly strengthening executive dominance, among other changes. Key changes in this regard include replacing the bicameral parliament with a unicameral “Kurultai” while widely expanding executive appointment authority and introducing a vice president that is appointed by the president, and other changes.
Article 53 of the proposed constitution fundamentally redesigns Kazakhstan’s legislature by establishing a unicameral parliament, renamed the Kurultai. The Kurultai will consist of 145 deputies each elected for a five-year term through a single nationwide electoral district under proportional representation. Notably, the draft makes no provision for quotas or reserved seats for independent candidates.
By abolishing the current bicameral system, consisting of the Majilis (lower house) and the Senate, and replacing it with this single chamber, the proposed constitution eliminates key institutional checks and balances that the Senate currently provides, thereby weakening the legislature in favor of the executive branch.
For example, under the current constitution, the president may appoint and dismiss the following key officials only with the Senate’s consent: the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, the Chairman of the Supreme Court (via Senate election on presidential proposal), the Chairman of the National Bank, the Prosecutor General, the Chairman of the National Security Committee, the Chairman of the Central Election Commission (partial), the Chairman of the Supreme Audit Chamber (partial), the Chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, the Head of the State Guard Service, and the Commissioner for Human Rights. Article 46.5 of the proposed 2026 constitution however grants the president unilateral authority to appoint and dismiss these officials without requiring parliamentary consent.
Other examples of weakening of parliament include Article 57, which states that the president will nominate the chairman of parliament – to be confirmed by secret vote in parliament. If parliament repeatedly refuses to confirm the president’s nominee, the president may in return dissolve parliament.
Article 62 further elaborates on the president’s powers to dissolve parliament; it states that the president has the right to dissolve the Kurultai after consultations with the Chairman of the Kurultai and the Prime Minister. It also grants the president powers to dissolve parliament in the event of a repeated refusal by parliament to grant consent to the appointment of any candidate proposed by the president when consent by parliament is needed.
Regarding the president’s expanded appointment powers in the new constitution – the new constitution also grants the president powers to appoint or nominate the following officials, typically backed by the threat of parliamentary dissolution in cases of repeated non-approval:
46.2 states that the president appoints and dismisses the vice president with the Kurultai’s consent, and that he or she may dissolve the Kurultai if it repeatedly refuses. 46.4 states that the president, after consultations with party factions in parliament, nominates a candidate for prime ministers (appointed with Kurultai consent), and independently appoints the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and internal affairs. Repeated refusal to approve the prime minister also triggers the president’s right to dissolve parliament. 46.8 states that the president appoints ten judges to the Constitutional Court, six members to the Central Election Commission, and eight members to the Supreme Audit Chamber, all with Kurultai consent, while repeated refusal to confirm any of these appointments likewise empowers the president to dissolve parliament.
In the view of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, these provisions grant the executive branch powerful leverage over the legislature. The explicit threat of dissolution effectively neutralizes any meaningful oversight role that the already weakened Kurultai might otherwise exercise.
The Halyk Kenesi
Section IV of the proposed constitution (Articles 70 and 71) provides for the establishment of the People’s Council of Kazakhstan (Qazaqstan Halyq Kenesi). Article 70.1 designates the Council as the highest consultative body representing the interests of the people of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Article 70.2 specifies that its composition shall be drawn from citizens of the Republic. Article 70.3 states that the detailed procedures for its establishment, the formation of its membership, its powers, and its operational rules will be governed by a separate constitutional law. However, the draft constitution itself provides no further detail on how the Council will actually be formed, leaving the process and criteria for selection currently unclear.
More strikingly, Article 71 grants the Halyk Kenesi (People’s Council) the power of legislative initiative – allowing it to submit draft laws directly to the Kurultai – as well as the authority to initiate a nationwide referendum. This places a nominally consultative body on equal footing with Parliament, the President, and the government in proposing legislation and referendums, further diluting the Kurultai’s central role in the law-making process.